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Abstract
Unsustainable growth in program costs and beneficiaries, together with a growing
recognition that even people with severe impairments can work, led to fundamental
disability policy reforms in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Great Britain. In Australia,
rapid growth in disability recipiency led to more modest reforms. Here we describe
the factors driving unsustainable DI program growth in the U.S., show their similarity to
the factors that led to unsustainable growth in these other four OECD countries, and
discuss the reforms each country implemented to regain control over their cash
transfer disability program. Although each country took a unique path to making and
implementing fundamental reforms, shared lessons emerge from their experiences.
JEL codes: J14, J18
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1. Introduction
Unsustainable growth in program costs and beneficiaries, together with a growing recog-
nition that even people with severe impairments can work, led to fundamental disability
policy reforms in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Great Britain. These fundamental reforms
substantially reduced disability recipiency rates in these nations and put their disability
programs back on a sustainable fiscal footing. For the most part the reforms focused on
slowing entry onto long-term disability cash transfers by keeping newly impaired workers
in the labor market. Although there were some efforts to reduce the number of existing
beneficiaries through disability reassessments and work incentives, these were both less
important and less successful. In Australia, rapid growth in disability recipiency led to
more modest reforms; disability recipiency rates have fallen slightly in response, but there
are reasons to believe the system remains vulnerable to a resurgence in growth.
The United States is now considering how best to reform its primary long-term dis-
ability cash transfer program, Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). As was the case
in Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Great Britain before their reforms, disability
recipiency in the U.S. is rising at an unsustainable pace. The DI rolls have risen from
1.2 million in 1967 to 8.8 million in 2012, and since 2009, the DI program has been
paying out more in annual benefits than it receives in taxes and interest from its trust
fund. Based on current growth, the DI program is projected to be insolvent by 2016
(Social Security Administration 2013a). At issue is whether modest reforms that adjust
aspects of the existing program or more fundamental reforms that change how disabil-
ity is identified and supported will be necessary to resolve these problems.
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Here we describe the factors driving unsustainable DI program growth in the U.S.,
show their similarity to the factors that led to unsustainable growth in these other four
OECD countries, and discuss the reforms each country implemented to regain control over
their cash transfer disability program. Although each country took a unique path to making
and implementing fundamental reforms, shared lessons emerge from their experiences.
First among them is that disability is not an immutable state, but rather a product of
health and the social, cultural, and economic environment faced by individuals with
impairments. This leads to the second lesson: disability policy itself affects the behavior
of individuals with impairments. As reforms in these countries demonstrate, generous
programs conditioned on not working lead to lower levels of work and higher disability
recipiency than programs focused on maintaining individuals with impairments in the
labor market.
The third lesson is that incentivizing individuals with impairments to stay in the labor
market is far easier than incentivizing existing disability beneficiaries to return to work.
This means that gaining control of disability rolls is best done by stemming the flow of
new beneficiaries rather than trying to reduce existing DI caseloads. Finally, a recurring
theme in each of the countries undertaking fundamental reforms is that disability
policy is part of the broader social safety net and cannot be altered independently. As
the experiences of these OECD nations demonstrate, attempts to alter disability pro-
grams without acknowledging that they interconnect with unemployment, retirement,
and general social welfare programs and vice versa can result in unintended changes in
program use and unsustainable growth in program rolls.
2. Disability program growth across countries
The number of workers receiving social insurance for disability has increased substan-
tially in most OECD nations over the past forty years. Population growth explains part
of this increase, but disability caseloads as a share of the working age population age—
known as the disability recipiency rate—also have risen rapidly1. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which shows the total number of persons receiving long-term categorical dis-
ability income benefits as a share of the working-age population in the United States
and four other OECD countries2. This is the number most critical to policymakers
since it measures the magnitude of the fiscal burden that these disability programs
place on country finances3. We show values beginning in 1970 through the last year
these data were made public in each country4. A more detailed description of the data
for each country is provided in Additional file 1: Appendix A.
The figure plots the level of disability recipiency (disability beneficiaries as a share of
the working-age population) over time for each country. In 1970, disability recipiency
rates in our three European nations were considerably higher: 3.5 percent in Sweden,
2.8 percent in Great Britain (1971) and 2.4 percent in the Netherlands, than they were
in Australia (1.6 percent) and the U.S. (1.2 percent). Since then disability recipiency
rates have risen substantially in each country, although as the figure highlights, they
have done so along significantly different trajectories.
To see these fluctuations more clearly, Table 1 provides average annual growth rates
in disability recipiency by decade and over the entire sample. As the table shows, dis-
ability recipiency rates rose in all countries during the 1970s, with especially rapid
growth in the Netherlands. In the 1980s, each country gained some control over their
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disability programs. Recipiency rates grew more modestly and even fell in the U.S. By
the 1990s, growth in the Netherlands ended and disability recipiency rates fell on
balance over the decade. In the other countries, rates increased, with Great Britain
posting the fastest pace of growth. During the 2000s, disability recipiency rates continued
to come down in the Netherlands and either plateaued (Australia) or fell (Sweden and
Great Britain) in all countries but the U.S.
The final average (1970-final) shows that smoothing through the fluctuations in
growth that have occurred over the decades, the U.S. has experienced the highest aver-
age annual growth rate over the sample period. This is because periods of unsustainable
growth in other countries were followed by program reforms that tempered or reversed
the path of disability recipiency and allowed countries to regain control of program
growth. In contrast, with the exception of the 1980s, growth in U.S. disability recipiency
has been nearly continuous over the sample period.
Of course one possible explanation for the differences in growth across countries is
that health and population characteristics have evolved differently for each nation over
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Australia Great Britain Netherlands Sweden United States
Source: Social Security Administration, US Census Bureau, Australian Government Department of Social Services, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Department of Work and Pensions, Office for National Statistics, Statistics Sweden and Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
yearbooks, Statistics Netherlands, and the Institute of Employee Benefit Schemes
Percentage
Figure 1 Growth in disability recipiency across countries.
Table 1 Average annual growth in disability recipiency by decade and Country1,2
Australia Great Britain Netherlands Sweden United States
1970-1979 4.09 1.89 11.45 5.49 5.65
1980-1989 1.73 1.27 1.79 1.59 −0.91
1990-1999 5.37 5.99 −0.34 1.44 4.10
2000-Final 1.18 −0.18 −1.25 1.00 3.71
1970-Final 2.98 2.08 2.69 2.30 3.10
Source: Social Security Administration, US Census Bureau, Australian Government Department of Social Services, Australian
Bureau of Statistics, Department of Work and Pensions, Office for National Statistics, Statistics Sweden and Swedish Social
Insurance Agency yearbooks, Statistics Netherlands, and the Institute of Employee Benefit Schemes. 1.) See Additional file
1 for a summary of data years utilized across countries. 2.) Average is computed as the average year over year percent
change in the recipiency rate within the given time period. For missing data a standard linear interpolation is used.
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time. If this is the case, then U.S. policymakers might find little guidance in the reforms
of other nations. For example, if health or population characteristics are driving growth
in the U.S. disability rolls, rather than disability policy and its implementation, then the
fundamental restructuring of disability policy undertaken in other nations may not be
warranted or successful in the U.S.
To understand the extent to which these factors might explain the growth in disabil-
ity recipiency shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, we compare trends in self-reported health
across countries and more formally evaluate the role that demographics and other
changes in the population eligible for disability benefits might have in impacting trends
in disability recipiency rates. We begin by examining trends in self-reported health over
time and across countries. Figure 2 reports data from the OECD on self-reported health
status for each of our countries. The plot shows the percentage of the population in
each country reporting that they are in good health on a survey that asks respondents
to state whether they are in good, fair, or poor health.
Although there are persistent differences across countries in the percent of individ-
uals reporting good health, there is little variation over time within countries5. Over the
past ten years the overall prevalence of good health among working-age populations
has remained relatively steady in each country. The relative stability of the health meas-
ure in each of our sample countries suggests that changes in the prevalence of disabil-
ities in the working-age population is unlikely to be responsible for the within and
across country fluctuations in disability recipiency rates found in Figure 1 and Table 1.
A second reason disability recipiency rates may have varied across countries over
time is that the eligible populations in those nations may have evolved differently. To
investigate this possible explanation, we compute counterfactual disability recipiency
rates for each country using the methodology in Daly et al. (2013). This measure repre-
sents the growth in disability recipiency rates, absent the influences of the aging of the
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Figure 2 Trends in self-reported health across countries.
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workforce and any increase in eligibility age for retirement benefits. In addition, in the
U. S., we also consider the rise in the employment rate of women and associated increase
in DI coverage (to be eligible for DI you must have worked at least 5 of the last 10 years)
which have changed over this period. The details of these calculations and the specific
factors we control for in each country are provided in Additional file 1: Appendix B.
Figure 3 (panels A through E), plot the actual (the same rates shown in Figure 1) and
adjusted disability recipiency rates, that net out these demographic and eligibility
factors, for each country over time. The gray bars in the figures reflect recession
periods in each country. The figures also include information about key policy changes
in each country; we will refer back to these in the next section when we summarize the
evolution of policy in each country.
The panels in the figure show that changes in the composition of the eligible popula-
tion have been more important in some countries than in others. For example, changes
in the eligible population had a notable effect in the U.S. and Australia whose post-
World War II baby boom generations were large. As these populations aged, they put
notable pressure on disability recipiency rates in the 1990s and 2000s. This was not the
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case in the three European countries, where adjustments for demographic changes
make almost no difference to the path of disability recipiency rates.
Overall, accounting for these changes does little to alter the picture developed
in Figure 1 and Table 1. This is confirmed in Additional file 1: Appendix B which repeat
the analysis in Figure 1 and Table 1 using the adjusted disability recipiency rates.
Additional file 1: Appendix B shows that controlling for these population factors, it re-
mains the case that over the entire sample period a higher share of working-age people
are on categorical disability cash transfers in the Netherlands, Sweden and Great Britain
than in the U.S. and Australia. Additional file 1: Appendix B shows that over the past 40
years, the U.S. has had the highest average growth rate. Thus, even when we adjust for
differences in population characteristics across countries, the U.S. remains an outlier in
experiencing ongoing growth in disability recipiency rates6. Since to date no major pol-
icy reforms have been implemented to address this growth, this gap between the U.S.
and these other countries is likely to grow larger in coming years.
The finding that neither health nor population characteristics can explain the cross-
country differences in disability recipiency rates, either levels or trends, underscores
the potential role for policy7. In what follows we describe how changes in disability
policy and its implementation in each country account for the fluctuations in the
growth of these disability recipiency rates.
3. Disability policy and program growth
In industrialized nations, social protection from income loss associated with disability
is just one part of a broader social safety net designed to protect working age individ-
uals from the loss of labor market income. Since labor market work is the primary
source of income for most families, OECD nations generally have built complex social
protection schemes designed to support individuals who are unable to earn wages in
the labor market. Most countries provide this protection in tiers associated with the
social expectations for employment of different groups.
In general, the first tier provides universal, long-term, needs-based cash transfers that
guarantee a social minimum income to all families. The second tier provides cash
support to those available for employment and expected to work, but who are tempor-
arily unemployed. These benefits are usually conditional on past work, limited in dur-
ation, and may be needs-based. The third tier targets benefits to those not expected to
work—the aged, disabled, etc.—and can either be needs-based or based on past earnings.
Since recipients of these benefits are not expected to return to employment, benefits are
typically higher and not time limited.
When these tiers provide substantially different amounts of income and their categor-
ies are mutable, it is critical that the long-term or higher benefit programs have verifi-
able eligibility criteria that allow program gatekeepers to consistently determine who
should come onto the program. For retirement programs this is straightforward; age is
an arbitrary but easily verifiable eligibility marker. Eligibility determinations by program
gatekeepers will not vary greatly over the business cycle and forecasts of program
growth will be relatively easy to make.
Disability is more difficult. Unlike retirement, there is no precise definition or easily
verifiable marker for determining categorical eligibility for long-term disability benefits.
Moreover, disability is not a static concept and social conceptualizations of disability
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evolve over time. For example, over the last 20 years the medical model of disability
underlying categorical disability programs in most OECD countries has been rejected
and replaced by a conceptualization that recognizes that the social environment is as
important as health in determining an individual’s ability to participate in society
(World Health Organization 2001)8. Under this model, “work disability” is a changeable
state that depends on a number of factors, including an individual’s health impairment,
the level of accommodation offered in the workplace, and the relative economic payoffs
associated with working or exiting the labor force to receive disability benefits.
The fluid nature of the disability category has meant that changes to disability policy
parameters such as the level of benefits and the scope of conditions that qualify have
had much larger impacts on caseload growth and disability recipiency rates than policy-
makers expected or even intended. For the most part, the unanticipated effects can be
traced back to the interplay between disability programs and the policy and economic
environment within which they operate.
For example, in a number of OECD nations, the relative value of disability benefits
has risen significantly over time, as policymakers have cut payments or imposed stricter
eligibility criteria on other benefit programs including unemployment insurance and
general welfare. Structural changes in the economy including the declining job and
wage prospects for low-skilled workers also have made disability benefits more attract-
ive as means of long-term income support. Finally, disability benefits have increasingly
become an option for displaced or long-term unemployed workers dislocated during
economic downturns. Since very few disability beneficiaries ever return to the labor
market, the growth in the rolls that occurs during and after recessions leads to a long
term increase in disability recipiency rates. These rates then remain elevated until these
recession induced cohorts of beneficiaries age out of the system or die. For a more
detailed discussion of these issues in OECD nations see Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (2010).
Below we discuss how disability program designs and changes in disability policy
parameters in Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. have
affected disability recipiency rates in each country. When relevant we also discuss how
these policy structures have interacted with macroeconomic conditions and the broader
social safety net to amplify growth in the disability rolls. For reference, Figure 3 (Panels A
through E) shows disability recipiency rates (unadjusted and adjusted) along with major
policy changes over time for each country. Table 2 provides key information about the
current state of disability programs in each nation.
3.1 The US experience
The United States has no first-tier, universal needs-based cash transfer program that
provides a guaranteed social minimum income floor to all its citizens. The Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, which is limited to the aged, disabled adults and par-
ents of disabled children, is its only long-term needs-based cash transfer program9,10.
The only other major categorical needs-based cash transfer program in the U.S. is
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which is targeted at single mothers
and provides an even lower guaranteed income level and the guarantee is limited to
5 years.
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Table 2 Disability program parameters across Countries as of 2013
Australia Great Britain Netherlands Sweden United States
Summary of
Benefits Program
Universal means-tested flat-rate
benefit payable to people with dis-
ability aged 16 and over.
Insurance-based flat-rate benefit
payable to people with disability
with sufficient work history; same
flat-rate benefit payable to people
with disability with insufficient work
history, but means-tested
Merged sickness and disability
program which makes a strict
distinction between fully and
partially disabled. Those fully
disabled receive guaranteed
income until age 65 while partially
disabled workers receive benefits
conditional on work history and
incapacity level determined by
doctor.
Merged sickness and disability
system with disability benefits
granted only to those deemed to
have permanent reductions in work
capacity.
Social insurance
program for workers
who have paid social
security taxes over their
working lives with
benefit levels tied to
past earnings.
Full or Partial
Benefits Program
Intended to cover only individuals
incapable of at least 15 hours per
week of gainful employment.
Intended to cover individuals with
very limited capacity to work, so
closer to a full disability program
than a partial disability program.
But not restricted to permanent
disability.
Program differentiates between full
(IVA) and partial disability (WGA)
and awards benefits accordingly
(see above).
Workers may receive sickness
benefits in the event of a sickness
(with approval of a doctor),
however disability insurance is only
granted to those with a serious
and permanent impairment that
reduces work ability.
Full disability program
designed to be a last
resort program for those
with permanent and
total disabilities.
Eligibility Criteria Must have a physical, intellectual or
psychiatric impairment which has a
severe (or extreme) functional
impact, and must be unable to
work at least 15 hours per week in
a minimum-wage job for at least
(the next) two years.
Must be assessed as having “limited
capacity to work”, i.e. scoring 15 or
more points on a points-based as-
sessment of physical and mental
capabilities
Applicants must meet with
designated doctor (either a
company doctor or agency) who
evaluate incapacity. Several
evaluations are carried out by
integration supervisors on a rolling
timeline during the initial two year
sickness period.
Sickness benefits are awarded for
first 14 days with a doctors
approval and reevaluated along a
rolling timeline with worker “check-
ins”. Disability benefits are only
awarded after the SIA determines
work capacity is permanently
reduced.
Full disability program
requiring applicants to
be unable to perform
any substantial gainful
activity for at least one
year.
Benefits Conditional
on Contributions?
No. Benefits are universal. No, but more heavily means-tested
for those with insufficient contribu-
tions (insufficient work history)
Yes. Benefits levels are conditional
on past earnings, number of weeks
worked before, and the percentage
of earnings the worker is deemed
capable of earning currently with
impairment.
There are two types of benefits
awarded. A universally guaranteed
pension provides assistance to all
those residing in Sweden. The
earnings related pension is
contingent upon weeks of work
and past earnings.
Yes, sufficient quarters of
coverage necessary as
defined described in
Social Security
Administration 2013b.
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Table 2 Disability program parameters across Countries as of 2013 (Continued)
Other Income
Programs for the
Disabled
State workers’ compensation
programs provide benefits for
workers injured on the job for up
to two years. Private disability
insurance policies also exist,
although commonly pay a single
lump sum for specified events
rather than an income stream.
Statutory Sick Pay for first 28 weeks
for those in employment prior to
onset; a range of additional costs
benefits are potentially available in
addition to ESA (e.g. housing
benefit, Personal Independence
Payment)
Means tested Social Assistance
Program (SA) with benefit equal to
minimum wage
Assistance Allowance, Car
Allowance and other programs are
designed to accommodate those
who have severe, long-term disabil-
ities meeting specific criteria
Workers Comp and SSI
and private disability
insurance
Burkhauser
et
al.IZA
Journalof
Labor
Policy
Page
9
of
30
2014, 3:4
http://w
w
w
.izajolp.com
/content/3/1/4
The second tier in the U.S. includes unemployment insurance benefits, which replace
a fraction of wages for covered workers for short periods of time. In normal economic
times, unemployment benefits can last up to 26 weeks. During recessions, this max-
imum is often extended and it rose to 99 weeks in the aftermath of the Global Financial
Crisis. Unemployment insurance benefits are generally higher than SSI or TANF
benefits.
The social security old-age retirement (OAI) and disability (DI) programs make up
the third tier of benefits in the U.S.; they provide social insurance to workers who have
paid social security taxes over their working life. To be eligible for benefits, workers
must have accumulated sufficient quarters of coverage, as defined in the Social Security
Administration’s pension rules. These requirements are sufficiently strict to limit OAI
and DI benefits to those with substantial attachments to the labor market. (For a sum-
mary of the benefit requirements and rules, see Social Security Administration 2013b.)
Benefit levels from these programs are based on past earnings and can be substantially
higher than the social minimum level of benefits guaranteed by the SSI aged and dis-
ability programs.
Eligibility for DI benefits requires applicants to meet a federal disability standard ap-
plied by administrative evaluators and adjudicators located in each state. The criteria
are in principle quite strict. Eligibility requires that a worker be “unable to perform any
substantial gainful activity on any job in the economy for at least one year”. There is no
benefit for partial disability. Disability benefits are intended to be a last-resort for those
with permanent and total impairments. See Table 2 for more details on the U.S. DI
program.
Although the written eligibility criteria have not changed over time, their implemen-
tation has and in a direction that has increased the number of working-aged adults
receiving disability benefits. Indeed, many of the disability recipiency rate fluctuations
shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 line up with changes in Social Security Administration
(SSA) policy that made it easier or harder to gain entry to the DI rolls. For example,
rapid disability recipiency rate growth in the 1970s aligns with Congressional actions
that increased the replacement rate for a disabled worker with median earnings from
35 to 49 percent (Figure 3, Panel E). In the late 1970s and early 1980s disability recipi-
ency rates fell, first because program gatekeepers were urged to more strictly interpret
existing rules, and then because Congress in 1980 required SSA to reevaluate all
current recipients to see if they still met the medical standards. This rule change, which
was rigorously enforced by SSA at the start of the new Reagan administration, resulted
in a drop in the DI rolls despite a major recession—the substantial drop in normalized
adjusted disability recipiency rates in the U.S. between 1978 and 1983 are in stark contrast
to the sizable growth in these values before 1978 and after 1990 (Figure 3, Panel E).
By 1983 the widespread reevaluation of those already on DI was halted as the
courts and then Congress restricted the SSA’s power to reevaluate beneficiaries.
Furthermore, in 1984, responding to a backlash against restrictive cuts imposed in
the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, policymakers expanded the ways
in which a person could medically qualify for the DI program. The 1984 legislation
moved away from a strict medical listing determination of eligibility to one that also
considered an applicant’s overall medical condition and ability to work. In addition,
the legislation allowed for symptoms of mental illness and pain to be counted when
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assessing DI eligibility, regardless of whether the person had a verifiable medical diagnosis
(Figure 3, Panel E)11.
The expansion of eligibility to more difficult to measure impairments that do not pre-
cisely meet the medical listings means that SSA has increasingly been tasked with mak-
ing more subjective decisions about the impact that presenting impairments might
have on an applicant’s work ability12. For applicants who do not meet or exceed the
medical listings, program administrators consider a set of vocational criteria. While
these vocational criteria have been in place over the history of the DI program, their
use by program gatekeepers to determine benefit eligibility has risen dramatically since
1991. Currently, they are used to justify the majority of new awards, especially among
those with the more difficult to determine conditions of mental illness and musculo-
skeletal conditions—the primary condition of more than 50 percent of all newly
enrolled beneficiaries (Burkhauser and Daly 2011).
One consequence of expanding eligibility beyond identifiable medical listings is that
DI applicants and gatekeepers have much more of a role in determining program
growth. For example, over time the cyclical sensitivity of DI application rates has risen
considerably. Applications rise during recessions and fall during periods of economic
growth (see Rupp and Stapleton 1995; Stapleton et al. 1998; Black et al. 2002; Autor
and Duggan 2003). But as can be seen in Figure 3, Panel E, increased applications
generally result in an increase in disability recipiency rates which do not subside as
economic conditions improve, since once on, very few beneficiaries ever leave the
program.
In addition to the cyclical sensitivity of disability applications and awards, there is evi-
dence that there has been a secular rise in the number of workers who apply over time
related to the unintentional increase in the replacement rates of DI for low wage
workers (Autor and Duggan 2003). Again, since few beneficiaries ever leave the rolls to
return to work, the surge in disability recipient rates associated with business cycle
fluctuations or economic restructuring has generally translated into a long-term
increase in disability recipiency rate in the working age population.
Finally, there is evidence that the strictness of DI gatekeepers also varies. Maestas
et al. (2013) using SSA administrative records estimate that 23 percent of applicants
are initially accepted or denied based on whether they were assigned an easier or a
stricter DDS gatekeeper rather than on differences in the status of their health or
impairment status.
3.2 The Netherlands13
As in the U.S., the disability system in the Netherlands contains both a social insurance
program that protects workers against lost labor earnings and a program that provides
a social minimum for disabled adults with little or no work history. A separate social
minimum scheme for the disabled self-employed ended in 2004. The Dutch social
insurance program (WAO/WIA) provides cash transfers to working-age men and
women based on lost labor earnings. The Netherlands does not have a separate pro-
gram similar to Workers’ Compensation. Rather, it has a longer-term disability transfer
program that, together with the sickness benefits all private firms must offer their
workers, provides a comprehensive system of both partial and total disability benefits
to workers regardless of how or where their disability occurred. The Dutch also have a
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categorical disability-based welfare program (Wajong) that, unlike the general welfare
scheme, is not means tested. This program is similar to the SSI-disabled adults program
in that it targets men and women whose disabilities occurred prior to their entrance into
the labor force and are severe enough that they have not engaged in full-time employment
as adults. (See Table 2 for details of the disability program in the Netherlands.)
One reason for the rapid growth in the Dutch disability program over the 1970s was
the relatively generous benefits that the system provided (Figure 3, Panel C). The
first level of disability protection for Dutch workers was a universal sickness benefit—
essentially a universal short-term disability system. In the 1970s, government pay-
ments from this program replaced up to 80 percent of net-of-tax wage earnings for
up to one year. However, most employees (90 percent) and all civil servants had the
rest of their net-of-tax earnings replaced by collective-bargaining agreements with
their employers. These disability replacement rates were far in excess of comparable
programs in the U.S. Sickness benefits were payable for up to twelve months. After
one year, employees still receiving benefits were eligible for disability benefit screening.
Workers with chronic conditions that caused a reduction in their capacity to perform work
commensurate with their job training and work history were eligible for disability benefits.
Those judged fully disabled were eligible for benefits equal to 80 percent of their previous
before-tax earnings. Those judged partially disabled (those with some residual earnings
capacity) were eligible for partial benefits; the minimum degree of impairment for eligibility
was 15 percent.
In a significant loosening of access to full disability benefits in the mid-1970s, Dutch
courts determined that unless disability evaluators could prove otherwise, they were
required to attribute a partially disabled worker’s lack of employment to discriminatory
behavior. The result was that it became “administrative practice” to treat unemployed,
partially disabled persons as if they were fully disabled. That interpretation of the law
made assessing lost earnings capacity unnecessary beyond the minimum 15 percent,
since that became sufficient to entitle a person to full benefits. This essentially made
the Dutch partial disability system a very generous full disability program. These
increases in eligibility together with the generosity of the system in large part explain
the 11.45 percent per year increase in adjusted Dutch disability recipiency rates seen in
Table 1 and Figure 3, Panel C, during the 1970s.
The serious recession of the early 1980s and the growing costs of the disability sys-
tem put pressure on the Dutch government to reduce the growth of disability-based
transfers. Reforms initiated between 1982 and 1987 were the first of three major efforts
over the next two decades to regain control of the Dutch disability transfer system. By
1985, a series of cuts in the replacement rate effectively lowered it from 80 percent of
before-tax income to 70 percent of after-tax income for both new entrants and current
beneficiaries. But that did not halt system growth completely and in 1987 the labor
market consideration rule was abolished. Despite the legal ban on including labor-
market considerations in their assessments, disability adjudicators still tended either to
grant or deny full benefits. Denial rates remained quite low, suggesting that the legal
change did not stop the de facto use of labor-market considerations in the adjudication
process. Nonetheless these changes are responsible for the slower growth in disability
recipiency in the 1980s that brought the Netherlands more in line with disability
growth in Sweden and Great Britain.
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But it was not until the 1994 reforms that disability recipiency rates began to drop.
These reforms included further tightening of eligibility criteria. Additionally, in a new
policy, firms were made responsible for an employee’s first six weeks of sick pay. The
introduction of this type of privatization of the disability system, although echoing a
similar reform introduced in Great Britain in the mid-1980s, was unprecedented in the
Netherlands. It represented a deliberate change in policy intended to encourage firms
to provide accommodation, rehabilitation, and continued employment opportunities to
workers as an alternative to moving them onto long-term cash benefits. The mandate
that firms would bear the full responsibility for sick pay was extended from six weeks
to one year in 1996. Despite these reforms, the decline in the Dutch disability recipiency
rate stopped in 1997 and began to slowly climb.
In 2002, the Dutch disability system began to phase in the third and most significant
set of reforms. These reforms culminated in the establishment of a new disability insur-
ance scheme in 2004—WIA—which replaced the WAO scheme that had been in place
since 1967. These systemic reforms fundamentally changed disability policy in the
Netherlands. The reforms made work rather than cash benefits the expectation and
enforced this by increasing the incentives of both employees and their employers to
invest more time and effort in accommodation and rehabilitation following the onset of
a disability.
Foremost among the reforms was the extension from one year to two years of the
mandate that firms (including small employers) bear full responsibility for employees’
sick pay. These changes effectively meant that during the first two years following a
health shock, workers were the responsibility of the firm and not eligible for long-term
government provided disability benefits. During these two years, employers must allow
workers receiving sickness benefits to remain with the firm and can only dismiss
employees who refuse to cooperate in a reasonable work-resumption plan.
The reforms also gave firms a list of prescribed rehabilitation and accommodation
activities that they (via a private occupational health agency) must provide to workers
to assist them in remaining on their job or finding alternative employment. When the
two years are complete, workers are allowed to apply for long-term disability benefits,
but they are required to provide documentation regarding return-to-work efforts during
the two-year period. In 2007, nearly 14 percent of disability insurance claims were returned
to employers and the employer continued to be responsible for employing the worker until
the claim was processed or the worker had returned to the old or a new job.
Reforms at the front end of the process were accompanied by significant reforms in
the longer-term benefit program. All employers were made to pay for the full and per-
manent disability program through a uniform pay-as-you-go premium rate. Employers
also had to pay to fund the publicly run partial disability program, but they could opt
out of it by enrolling their workers with a private insurer instead. Either way, employers
have to pay experience-rated premiums that cover the first ten years of partial disability
benefit receipt. After ten years, benefits are covered by the uniform pay-as-you-go rates
that also cover the fully and permanently disabled and the stock of current beneficiaries
under the old system. Based on these reforms, the Dutch disability system, long seen as
out of control, is now considered by Prinz and Thompson (2009) in their comparison
of OECD disability systems as one that has learned from its mistakes and provides an
example for other OECD countries to follow.
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While it is still too early to determine the full effect of these policy changes on the
Dutch disability beneficiary population, Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2011) provides the
first micro-simulation of the consequences of the post-2002 round of policy changes
discussed above. They estimate that the combined impact of the introduction of experi-
ence rating together with the introduction of the statutory Gatekeeper Protocol and
stricter examinations will reduce the projected long-term number of disability benefi-
ciaries by 600,000 and that the introduction of the new WIA scheme will further
reduce that projected number by 250,000 by 2040, as compared to a “no-change
scenario.”
3.3 Sweden
Like most European nations Sweden has a long-standing first-tier, universal needs-
based cash transfer program that provides a guaranteed social minimum income floor
to all its citizens. This first-tier protection is funded out of general revenues and is
available to everyone who lives or works in Sweden. Although benefits provide mini-
mum income to anyone in need, applicants apply for benefits based on income and
particular circumstances, such as disability, parental needs, or old age. Benefits are set
nationally and indexed to keep pace with the price level.
Sweden also provides second and third tier benefits. The second tier in Sweden includes
unemployment insurance benefits, which include both a mandatory and voluntary compo-
nent. The mandatory component is paid for by all employers and replaces a minimum frac-
tion of wages for covered workers. The number of weeks covered by unemployment
insurance has fluctuated over time but is generally longer than in the U.S. Most individuals
also are covered by voluntary unemployment insurance which is negotiated between firms
and trade unions. Somewhat uniquely among the countries we review, Sweden also has
many private options for unemployment insurance; these may be purchased individually or
through an employer.
Sweden provides third tier benefits, including old-age pensions and sickness and dis-
ability benefits, through a combination of programs. For those with an earnings history
the bulk of the protection is provided based on a social insurance program that, as
in the U.S., is financed by statutory employer and employee contributions. Many
employers in Sweden also pay into occupational-based insurance and pension programs
on behalf of their employees. Participation in these schemes is driven by competitive
forces or collective bargaining agreements with unions but a majority of employers in
Sweden participate in these programs. See Table 2 for more details about the Swedish
disability system.
As in the Netherlands, a key reason for the rapid growth in the Swedish disability
program over the 1970s (see Table 1) was the relatively generous benefits that the sys-
tem provided. That generosity was apparent both in the ease of entry onto the program
and the replacement rate of benefits. The first level of protection for Swedish workers
with health problems is a sickness benefit. In the 1970s, sickness benefits replaced
about 90 percent of expected earnings for individuals with “abnormal physical or men-
tal conditions” that reduced their normal work capacity by at least 25 percent. Workers
claiming sickness absence for more than eight days were required to get a certificate
from a doctor. This was primarily facilitated by the individual’s doctor with no central-
ized screening or standards.
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After one year, employees still receiving benefits could apply for long-term disability
insurance. Workers with functional limitations that caused a reduction in their capacity
to perform work commensurate with their job training and work history were eligible
for disability benefits. Benefits were awarded for partial (50 percent) and full disability.
For those under age 60, benefits included rehabilitation and vocational training. For
those 60 and older, beneficiaries were provided income support. Like sickness benefits,
disability benefits were very generous replacing the vast majority of expected lost
earnings.
Over the course of the 1970s, standards for obtaining long-term disability benefits
were also loosened to make it easier for the long-term unemployed to move onto the
program. For workers of all ages, unemployment spells of more than one year were
added to the list of criteria considered in the disability screening process. For workers
over age 60, long-term unemployed became a sufficient condition for moving onto
disability benefits, even without a certifiable functional limitation. Similar to the Dutch
case, these changes meant that the disability benefit program was increasingly being
used as a very generous long-term unemployment insurance program14.
Generous benefits and easier access resulted in steady growth in disability recipiency
rates over the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 3, Panel D). These features also left the program
vulnerable to rapid growth related to the serious recession in the early 1990s. As shown
in Figure 3, Panel D, following the foreign exchange crisis in 1990 and ensuing deep
recession, disability recipiency rates surged. Policymakers responded by lowering the
replacement rates on sickness benefits, making employers pay for the first 14 days of
sickness absence, and removing the pure labor market criteria for disability benefits for
older workers. With these changes to policy and an improving economy, disability re-
cipiency rates stabilized for most of the rest of the decade. That said, they remained
quite high and at a level that policymakers believed unsustainable. As such, additional
policy reforms were made throughout the 1990s designed to increase the employer cost
of worker sickness absence and increase the threshold for workers applying for sickness
and/or disability benefits15.
Facing increasing fiscal pressures and a renewal of disability recipiency rate growth
(Figure 3, Panel D), in 2000 the Swedish government proposed much more sweeping
reforms to the sickness and disability system. Despite considerable opposition from
various advocacy groups, significant reforms were put into place over the remainder of
the decade. The driving principle behind the reforms was that work support, rather
than cash assistance in lieu of work, was the primary goal of disability policy.
This general principle translated into a number of important specific reforms. In
2003, the government merged the sickness benefits and disability systems and began a
series of changes to standardize and enforce the administration of these now joint
systems. Most notable among them was the centralization of screening processes. Up
until this point, certification for sickness benefits had been variable as had disability
benefit allowance rates. Although rehabilitation and vocational training were goals,
many doctors and regional disability gatekeepers focused on providing income support
rather than work retraining. By centralizing the process and developing standardized
protocols for granting cash benefits, policymakers were better able to regulate the gate-
keepers and enforce the strategy of promoting participation in work before offering
cash benefits. Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness, the idea is that this
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standardization will temper the link between regional economic conditions and disabil-
ity recipiency that had historically been present.
In addition to standardizing the screening process, the merger of the sickness and
disability programs forced disability gatekeepers to become actively involved early in
the process. By getting vocational and rehabilitation experts involved early, at the sick-
ness benefit stage, policymakers intended to stem the flow of new applicants to the
long-term disability program. To aid in this process, sickness benefits were capped at
one year, and beneficiaries were evaluated for work ability at 180 days of absence. Only
those who could show that they had no capacity to perform any job were allowed to
remain on the program for the full year. In addition, employers were required to work
with disability administrators to create a rehabilitation plan. And gatekeepers were
given the power to demand that employers provide certification about the types of
accommodations they made for the worker. These reforms resulted in a decline in the
use of sickness benefits and a subsequent decline in the flow of new beneficiaries onto
the long-term disability system.
In 2008 the Swedish government undertook an additional series of reforms to its
sickness and long-term disability programs (these reforms are detailed in Hartman
2011 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2009). These
reforms were meant to further curb growth in the rolls and more actively return newly
impaired workers to back to the labor market. The 2008 reforms went beyond engaging
gatekeepers and employers and focuses on individuals with disabilities. New rules
aimed at strengthening the incentives for individuals with disabilities to work and
improving their opportunities to do so. The principal reform was the establishment of
a new timeline for the provision of rehabilitation services under the sickness absence
program with checkpoints closely aligned with assessment of work capacity and a
reduction of the cash value of sickness benefits for those who did not return to work.
In addition to adding more checkpoints, the reforms also front-loaded the evaluations
so that they were being done at 3-, 6-, and 12-month increments. The earlier check-
points provided rehabilitation, counseling and assessment much closer to the onset of
an impairment, when return to work was more likely.
The reforms significantly increased the return to work of new sickness program
entrants and reduced their time on the program. In contrast, few of those already on
the sickness program when the new reforms were initiated ever returned to work.
When their sickness benefits ended they simply moved onto other social assistance
programs. These findings provide empirical evidence that early intervention matters.
Waiting even one year following the onset of impairment significantly reduces the
chance that rehabilitation will result in a return to work. Importantly, these reforms
resulted in further reductions in disability recipiency rates in Sweden (Figure 3, Panel D).
Although the disability reforms put in place by the Swedish government late in the
2000s effectively reduced disability recipiency rates in the nation, the reduction came
mostly from reductions in new beneficiaries rather than returning existing beneficiaries
to work. In recent reforms, policymakers have specifically focused on reducing disabil-
ity caseloads. For example, in January 2013 the government launched an experiment
that allows a large group of existing beneficiaries to return to work without fear of ever
losing their right to return to benefits. So far the program has had little impact on the
work effort of existing beneficiaries eligible for the program. Although early in the
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experiment the limited impact suggests that returning beneficiaries to the labor market
after a long absence is difficult.
3.4 Great Britain
Great Britain has substantially reconfigured the way it provides social insurance and
social welfare cash transfers over the last four decades. In 1971 it provided first tier
universal needs-based cash transfers via its Supplementary Benefit program. It provided
somewhat higher second tier cash transfers via its Unemployment Benefit program for
those expected to work. Great Britain’s major social insurance program for working age
people with disabilities between 1971 and 1995 was its Invalidity Benefit (IVB). All
those of working age who were deemed unable to work in their usual occupation
on grounds of ill health or disability (determined largely by the claimant’s family
doctor) and who had a record of sufficient social insurance contributions (paid during
employment) were eligible, initially for Sickness Benefit (the first 28 weeks) and subse-
quently for IVB.
Both Sickness Benefit and IVB-proper recipients were counted in the IVB register. In-
dividuals with an insufficient record of social insurance payments were eligible for
“credits only” payments (the IVB system would pay their social insurance contribu-
tions) generally alongside means-tested Supplementary Benefit payments. This group
was also counted in the IVB register.
IVB paid a slightly higher third tier flat rate to beneficiaries, which was more gener-
ous than unemployment benefits for longer-duration claimants. Some (generally older
recipients with a sufficiently long work history) also received a small earnings-related
premium known as the Additional Pension. Even for those receiving this Additional
Pension their replacement rates were still considerably less generous than those in the
Swedish and Dutch disability systems. This regime was in place throughout the period
of slow but steady growth in disability recipiency rates over the 1970s and early 1980s
(see Figure 3, Panel B).
The 1980s brought a number of major changes that affected IVB recipiency rates in
opposite directions. One change in particular that held back growth during the early-
mid-1980s was the introduction of Statutory Sick Pay in 1983, which–like the
Netherlands–made employers responsible for paying sickness benefits, in this case for the
first 8 weeks of a claim. This was extended to 28 weeks in 1986. These beneficiaries were
not counted by the IVB register, so even if this reform did not impact behavior – which
seems unlikely given the change to employer incentives – it did remove many short-
duration claims from the roll (see Anyadike-Danes and McVicar 2008).
Labor market factors, including recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s and
rapid structural change away from mining and heavy industry throughout the 1980s
and into the 1990s, acted in the opposite direction. Indeed the rapid growth in the dis-
ability recipiency rates during the latter half of the 1980s and the first half the 1990s
has been widely interpreted as a form of hidden unemployment (Figure 3, Panel B).
These were applicants with health-related impairments who had lost their jobs and
resided in local labor markets characterized by low labor demand, who either moved
directly onto IVB or switched to IVB following an unsuccessful period of job search on
(less generous) unemployment benefits (see Beatty et al. 2000). Further, echoing the
trend in the US, a growing proportion of IVB claims over this period were related to
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hard-to-measure mental illness or muscular-skeletal conditions, despite no explicit
change in the medical screening regime for IVB over this period (McVicar 2008).
Both financial and “hassle-avoidance” incentives to shift to IVB from unemployment
benefits were intensified with the introduction of Restart in 1987–1988, which imposed
compulsory work-focused interviews for long-term unemployment benefits claimants,
reduced the generosity of unemployment benefit payments, and introduced a require-
ment to show evidence of job search activity at fortnightly signing interviews. Huddleston
(2000) suggests “there is clear evidence of a ‘structural break’ around 1987” in moves from
unemployment to IVB (for which no such reforms had been introduced), coinciding with
the in-step increase in disability recipiency rates.
Another factor likely contributing to growth in the IVB rolls occurred in 1988 when
the Income Support program replaced Supplementary Benefits as the primary means-
tested social assistance payment for those out of work with insufficient work history to
qualify for IVB proper or other insurance-based payments. Although there were various
elements to this reform, the key change for our purposes was that those claiming
Income Support on grounds of disability, and thus counted in the disability roll, could
now receive a higher level of payment (the Disability Premium) than those claiming
Income Support on other grounds.
Because yearly increases in IVB fixed rate (since the 1980s), unemployment, and
social assistance payment benefits are tied to inflation they have generally declined rela-
tive to real wages, hence lowering their real replacement rate even at the bottom of the
wage distribution. But for those IVB beneficiaries who were also eligible the Additional
Pension this was less the case since their value was tied to real wages. This was espe-
cially the case in the recessionary years of the early 1990s when rises in Additional Pension
benefits temporarily made IVB more than twice as generous as unemployment benefits for
many older recipients (Huddleston 2000).
This period of rapid growth in disability recipiency rates came to an abrupt end in
1995, with a set of major reforms that ended the IVB program and replaced it with
the Incapacity Benefit (IB) program for all new beneficiaries. Like other European
countries, this reform attempted to slow inflows into the disability benefit system–
which had been particularly high during the years of rapid growth leading up to
1995 (Anyadike-Danes and McVicar 2008)–rather than reduce the existing stock of
beneficiaries. Means-tested beneficiaries of the Income Support program with disabil-
ities continued to receive a Disability Premium and be counted as part of the IB
program. But IB was both less generous than IVB (the earnings-related Additional
Pension was scrapped for new claimants and payments were made taxable) and most
importantly the medical eligibility system was tightened. Medical screening was now
carried out by government doctors, working for the relevant agency, rather than
family doctors. This type of standardization is similar to that adopted by Sweden in
2006 (although workers’ eligibility for up to 28 weeks of Statutory Sick Pay was still
determined by family doctors).
The bar was also set higher, moving to an assessment of the claimant’s capacity to
carry out any work rather than work in their usual occupation16. In addition, IB’s status
as a social insurance payment was blurred in 1999 with the introduction of limited
means-testing for new claimants with significant (private) pension income, even those
who had made sufficient social insurance payments to be otherwise fully covered for IB
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benefits. There were also further reforms tightening the conditions for unemployment
benefit receipt and reducing its generosity over this period, most notably the replace-
ment of the old regime of unemployment benefits with Jobseekers’ Allowance in 1996.
This tightening of second tier unemployment benefits might in part explain why dis-
ability recipiency rolls began to rise again in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Disability recipiency rates only began to fall again in the mid-2000s coincident with a
new set of work-first reforms called Pathways to Work, aimed at slowing the inflow of
disability beneficiaries and boosting outflows for those having recently joined the roll.
This program was piloted in 2003 and rolled-out nationally beginning in 2005. It made
movement onto the IB program (including receipt of social assistance on disability
grounds) conditional on attendance at work-focused interviews, with the aim of steer-
ing at least some recipients into employment support services and ultimately back into
the labor market. It also introduced a ‘back to work’ bonus payment and provided
additional in-work condition-management health support for those returning to
employment from IB. Finally, medical assessments (now relabeled Personal Capability
Assessments) were brought forward, taking place 3 months into the IB claim rather than
6 months into the claim. Early evaluation evidence from the pilots suggested that
Pathways to Work made a significant contribution to falling (local) disability rolls at the
time, although the extent to which this was reflected at the national level has subsequently
been questioned17.
Disability recipiency rates have continued to decline since then, even in the midst of
the deep and long-lasting slump in labor demand associated with the Global Financial
Crisis. In part this is likely to reflect the inflow-constraining effects of the earlier
reforms to disability benefits described above. But there have also been further reforms
to disability benefits over the last five years, which are likely to have further restrained
growth in the disability roll despite the difficult macroeconomic conditions.
In 2008 the new Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) program replaced IB as
well as IS on grounds of disability for new applicants. This new program of insurance-
based benefit for those with sufficient work history and means-tested social assistance
benefit for those without sufficient work history included a new tougher Work Capability
Assessment, with fewer exemptions, in place of the existing system of Personal Capability
Assessments (see Sissons 2009). The requirement to attend work-focused interviews intro-
duced under Pathways to Work has been extended into a requirement to engage in work-
related activity for all but the most severely disabled, linked explicitly to payments, with
around one quarter of the existing benefit payment made conditional upon compliance.
There is also no longer a higher rate of payment for longer-duration claims. Sissons (2009)
interprets the lack of growth in disability recipiency rates over the period 2008–2009 as
evidence that they have ceased to play a role as a major destination for the hidden
unemployed.
In a break with the tradition of reforms largely targeted on inflows (or at least recent
joiners) to disability rolls, and echoing similar efforts at activation of existing recipients
in Sweden, between 2009 and 2013 existing IB recipients have also been reassessed
under the new ESA eligibility criteria. Many have been judged ineligible as a result of
medical re-screening under the stricter Work Capability Assessment, although some
have since successfully appealed these decisions and others, as was the case in Sweden,
have moved onto unemployment benefits rather than into employment. It remains to
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be seen whether the additional activation measures for existing recipients will have any
more impact than was the case in Sweden.
3.5 Australia
Unlike the other disability programs discussed above whose benefits are at least partly
conditional on past contributions, Australia’s disability income support program—the
Disability Support Pension (DSP)—does not provide benefits based on workers past
earnings or even require them to have “paid for coverage”. Instead it is most similar to
a means-tested guaranteed minimum income program whose benefits are greater than
those provided by other Australian welfare or unemployment benefit programs. Hence,
DSP is closer in concept to a disability-based welfare program than a traditional social
insurance program. However its benefit guarantee is substantially higher relative to
average wage earnings in Australia than is the U.S. SSI benefit guarantee relative to
average wage earnings in the U.S. In that sense its replacement of lost earnings is closer
to what DI pays in the U.S. In both Australia and the U.S. disability program benefits
are substantially less generous than those of the Netherlands and Sweden.
Nonetheless the DSP program is susceptible to the same risks to growth discussed in
the context of our other countries, since it pays benefits higher than those from other
programs and eligibility is based on the malleable concept of disability. While there
have been some changes in the DSP income disregard, tax rates, and in its nominal
benefit guarantee, over the entire period from 1970 to 2011, the break-even income
threshold where DSP benefits go to zero has only increased slightly faster than average
wage earnings. Although this represents an overall “loosening” of the income eligibility
criteria for DSP, it is not large enough to explain the variations in disability recipiency
rates pictured in Figure 3, Panel A.
Cai and Gregory (2004) show that there was little or no trend increase in the level of
the DSP benefit guarantee payment relative to average weekly earnings between 1970
and 1999—it rose slightly in the early 1970s and has since been a relatively constant
fraction of average weekly earnings—suggesting that increases in the replacement rate are
not an important explanation for DSP growth over the period up to 1999. Moreover, over
the first decade of the 2000s the income threshold actually increased more slowly than
average earnings, corresponding to a “tightening” of eligibility criteria for DSP and coin-
ciding with a flattening out of the cumulative unadjusted DSP recipiency rates over the
period and a slight decline in the cumulative adjusted DSP recipiency rates between 2002
and 2007 (McVicar and Wilkins 2013).
But, DSP has become more generous relative to earnings at the lower end of the
earnings distribution, at least over the period from 1993 to 2011, and this may be a
more relevant comparison for low-skilled workers with disabilities. For example, over
this period, adult full-time weekly earnings at the 10th percentile increased by a factor
of just under 2, whereas the maximum DSP payment has increased by a factor of
approximately 2.4 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1994, 2013). Similarly, the level of
DSP payments has increased substantially relative to the level of the Australian mini-
mum wage over the period from 2000 to 2011, and particularly from 2008 onwards. The
DSP has also become more generous relative to more general income-support payments,
most notably unemployment benefit (known as ‘Newstart Allowance’ (NSA) since 1996),
since the mid-1990s.
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Nonetheless it is likely that the major changes in DSP recipiency rates shown in
Figure 3, Panel A, are driven by changes in disability eligibility criteria rather than the
relative generosity of benefits. This view is supported by work by Cai and Gregory
(2004) who suggest that the small drop in DSP recipiency rate between 1980 and 1982
was the result of a tightening of eligibility rules by the administrative authority, which
began placing greater emphasis on medical factors and less weight on socio-economic
factors, but that this change in approach was largely reversed in 1983, when the Labor
Government came to power.
The most important run up in the adjusted DSP recipiency rate occurred in the
1990s (Figure 3, Panel A). Australia experienced its last official and most serious reces-
sion in the early 1990s. In 1991, in the midst of this recession, there was a major
change in the DSP eligibility criteria. To be eligible for DSP a worker had to be incap-
able of working more than at 15 per cent capacity. This was increased from 15 per cent
(an 85 per cent work impairment standard) to ‘no more than 30 hours per week’—
effectively a 25 per cent impairment standard if a 40-hour work week is considered
normal. This effectively changed DSP from a long-term total disability program to a
long-term partial disability program with no reduction in benefits. Hence it required
DSP gatekeepers to decide if an unemployed worker with a partial (as low as 25 per cent)
disability was unemployed because of his or her disability or because of economic condi-
tions in the midst of a period of slow economic growth and high unemployment rates.
It is not surprising that DSP rates increased substantially over this period. While DSP
benefits were not significantly greater than first tier social minimum benefits, DSP then
provided a somewhat higher and more permanent income floor with no work require-
ment18. Because, as in the U.S., few entrants to DSP leave the program to return to
work, such increases in the inflow of beneficiaries during recessions led to increases in
disability recipiency rates that lasted over many additional years.
As the Australian economy recovered and then expanded, growth in DSP recipiency
rates slowed (Figure 3, Panel A). Although unemployment has ebbed and flowed in
Australia since then, the deterioration in employment conditions during the two subse-
quent worldwide recessions, especially during the Global Financial Crisis, has been less
severe in Australia than in the U.S and other OECD countries. Nonetheless DSP recipi-
ency rate growth increased during both worldwide recessions. And since 2008, DSP
recipiency rates have increased each year despite a major DSP eligibility change in July
2006 that lowered the work capacity level from no more than 30 hours to no more than
15 hours per week—effectively an increase from a 25 to a 62.5 per cent in the impair-
ment standard.
McVicar and Wilkins (2013) provide a reason for this recent growth. Since 1996 DSP
benefit levels—whose growth is indexed to average wage earnings—have grown, both
with respect to the minimum wage and with respect to the first tier universal social
minimum income guarantee program that is tied to an inflation index. Hence DSP is
not only replacing a greater percentage of low skilled workers’ wage earnings but is an
increasingly attractive alternative to Australia’s Newstart Allowance social minimum
benefit guarantee. This pattern is similar to the one documented by Autor and Duggan
(2003) and Autor et al. (2008) for the U.S.
Cai and Gregory (2004) and McVicar and Wilkins (2013) also argue that reforms to
non-DSP welfare payments over the 1990s and 2000s had unintended consequences for
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DSP receipt. Certain types of payments, such as for temporary sickness, were discontin-
ued in the 1990s and–more importantly–over the 1990s and 2000s welfare benefits for
the unemployed and for lone parents became increasingly conditional on verifiable job
search and participation in active labor market programs, reducing the relative attract-
iveness of these benefits. Consistent with these changes, and also with the increased
relative generosity of DSP, McVicar and Wilkins (2013) show that over the period from
1993 to 2011, receipt of non-DSP welfare benefits by people with disability declined
appreciably, but that this was largely offset by the increase in DSP receipt. Thus,
welfare reforms that made the benefits for unemployment and lone parents less generous
were to some extent thwarted by the shift of significant numbers of beneficiaries from
these non-DSP welfare programs to the DSP.
The increased incentives for unemployed low skilled applicants to apply for disability
benefits puts additional pressure on DSP gatekeepers to only admit those who are
unemployed because their impairment reaches the DSP standard. But because the rela-
tionship between impairment and disability is mutable this is hard to do. Thus, in eco-
nomic downturns, the increased pool of potentially eligible unemployed workers is
likely to result in program growth and may have done so despite the increase in eligibil-
ity standards in 2006. This suggests that while the tightening of program eligibility rules
from a 25 to a 62.5 per cent impairment standard may have had some role in mitigating
the rise in the relative generosity of DSP program benefits, it is more likely that it is
the strong Australian economy that did not go into recession, rather than a fundamen-
tal change in its disability system, that is responsible for the plateauing of DSP recipi-
ency rates over the 2000s reported in Figure 3, Panel A and Table 1. If the economy
rather than reforms are responsible, Australia likely remains vulnerable to increases in
disability recipiency in the future (for a fuller discussion of this issue, see Burkhauser
and Daly 2013).
4. Conclusion and lessons from reforms in other countries
In the remainder of this paper we consider how the reform experiences in Australia,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden can inform U.S. policymakers tasked with
ensuring DI’s fiscal sustainability.
First and foremost to effectively design policies to curb disability recipiency rate
growth, policymakers have to acknowledge why it is growing. A large body of research
has shown that in advanced industrialized economies with large and complicated safety
nets, both exogenous factors—population demographics, population health, or economy-
wide shocks–and endogenous factors—changes in eligibility rules, benefit replacement
rates, or access to other social programs–can influence disability recipiency rate growth.
The disability reforms undertaken in the Netherlands, Sweden and Great Britain were pos-
sible once these countries acknowledged that changes in behavior rather than changes in
health were driving program growth. By recognizing that their policy designs influence
behavior and program outcomes, policymakers opened the door to more fundamental
disability policy changes.
Importantly, this acknowledgement also allowed policymakers to rethink their na-
tional disability scheme’s goals and bring them more in line with modern notions of
disability. This meant discarding terminology and criteria of incapacity and replacing
them with a focus on ability. More than just semantic window dressing the new
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terminology changed people with impairments expectations from dependence on disability
benefits based on not working to work. Of course, for some individuals work was not
possible, but this increasingly became the exception rather than the norm.
As the previous section demonstrated, each nation implemented reforms slightly dif-
ferently, but all shared the goal of curbing unsustainable program growth by changing
the culture and social expectations of and for people with disabilities and better align-
ing the incentives embedded in program design with these expectations. The data show
the reforms have generally been successful. Although each of the nations recognize
their reforms have not been completely successful, from the U.S. perspective these
reforms demonstrate that policies matter and provide a relevant starting point for
discussions about reforming the U.S. system.
Below we provide the four lessons most relevant to U.S. policymakers.
Lesson 1. Disability does not mean incapacity
Although disability is frequently thought of as an immutable, health-based condition
that limits functionality and prevents the performance of socially expected tasks (such
as attending school or working), modern notions of the productive capacity of all
people is at odds with this characterization. A more accurate concept of disability, and
one embodied in the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and
Health (ICF), considers disability to be the product of an interactive process between
an individual’s health conditions and the social and physical environment. In this
perspective, disability is neither immutable nor determined solely by health.
Each of the European countries we reviewed embrace this idea. Ensuring that their
citizens with disabilities have the opportunity to work in the paid labor market is now a
government priority19. Key among the findings based on their successful efforts to
reduce their disability recipiency rates is that a substantial share of people who were
moving onto the long-term cash transfer disability programs were, with reasonable
levels of support, able to find or maintain employment. Of course, a subset of workers
with disabilities have impairments so severe that work is not possible, but this has
proven to be a smaller portion than previously accepted onto these programs. And
those now coming onto the rolls are, by demonstration rather than assumption, unable
to integrate effectively into the labor market even with appropriate incentives and
support20. This design offers an important advantage over programs based on categorical
determinations of disability that can expand in unintended ways when individuals are
incentivized to change their behavior (i.e., attempt or not attempt to work) to become
eligible.
The lesson for U.S. disability policy is that the population with disabilities is heteroge-
neous and many of its members can work. This view is at odds with the current U.S.
system in which the Social Security Administration (SSA) requires applicants to dem-
onstrate an inability to perform substantial gainful activity before receiving access to
benefits or any other type of support, including work support. Embracing the ideas of
many European countries about the work capacity of individuals with disabilities calls
for restructuring the U.S. system to bring forward the focus on employment and make
long-term cash benefits a last-resort option once rehabilitation and accommodation
had failed.
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Lesson 2. Incentives affect behavior
Once it is recognized that the social and cultural environment faced by individuals with
impairments partly determines the extent to which their impairment limits them, it is
easy to see that the incentives embedded in policy design can affect outcomes. The
important lesson from the reforms in our sample of countries is that it is important to
correctly incentivize all actors in the process to attain the outcomes desired.
In the Netherlands, this meant making employers bear more of the direct costs of the
program and making employees comply with rehabilitation and retraining in order to
maintain benefits. In Sweden this meant standardizing the disability screening process
and holding disability gatekeepers accountable for engaging applicants in work rehabili-
tation plans. Sweden also mandated that employers document how they had attempted
to accommodate impaired workers. Finally, reforms focused on making workers comply
with the work-first approach by reducing or eliminating benefits to those workers who
did not comply with the rehabilitation and accommodation plans. Great Britain has
similarly made employers responsible for paying sickness benefits for the first 28 weeks
of a claim, has standardized the disability screening process, and has made it increas-
ingly difficult to remain passively on long-term disability benefits without engaging in
work-related activity. Reforms have also sought to address financial incentives related
to imbalances in replacement rates between disability benefits and other welfare bene-
fits. In Australia, most recently (since 2011) it has meant implementation of a new
disability benefit assessment procedure, under which eligibility for benefits typically
requires evidence that claimants were unable to obtain employment through vocational
rehabilitation or other employment services over a period of up to two years, during
which time claimants receive NSA and associated support services.
The lesson for U.S. policymakers is that program incentives affect how people with
disabilities and their employers react to, and fare after, the onset of a health impair-
ment. In the U.S., DI is funded from a payroll tax and the federal government is
responsible for a great share of the costs associated with providing long-term disability
benefits to working-age people with disabilities. Because employers bear no direct
responsibility for funding benefits paid to former employees, employers have no direct
financial incentive to accommodate and rehabilitate employees who become impaired.
Incentivizing employers to make greater investments in accommodation and rehabilita-
tion by creating a scheme that makes employers internalize some or all of the costs of
moving employees onto long-term disability could curb DI growth by more effectively
aligning incentives. Autor and Duggan 2010 and Burkhauser and Daly 2011 propose
two different models for doing this in the U.S.
As the reforms in these countries show, incentives cannot be changed solely for
employers. Incentives for people with disabilities and program gatekeepers also need to
be aligned with program goals to realize sizeable and lasting reductions in disability
recipiency rates.
Lesson 3. Early intervention reduces flows—stocks are harder
A recurring theme in the experiences of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden is
that reforms focused on early intervention can be very successful at reducing the flow
of new beneficiaries onto the program and/or boosting the flow of new beneficiaries off
the program. For example, early intervention that coordinated employer actions with
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the employees’ particular health shock were critical to keeping impaired workers in the
labor force in the Netherlands. Such intervention significantly increased the return to
work of impaired workers and reduced time on the sickness or disability program.
Evidence from Sweden shows that waiting even one year following the onset of impair-
ment significantly reduces the chance that rehabilitation will result in a return to work.
Evidence from Great Britain suggests that bringing medical screening forward can help
to control program growth.
In contrast, none of these countries, nor Australia, has been successful to date at
moving existing longer-term beneficiaries back into the labor market, although the
process of re-screening and seeking to activate existing longer-term beneficiaries in
Great Britain has only recently begun. Across all countries, once enrolled on disability
benefits for more than a few months, only a small fraction of recipients return to work.
Even when strict time limits are put in place, as in the case of Sweden, movement off the
disability system for longer-duration beneficiaries is difficult. Even when it is done, most
frequently it results in a shift to another public program rather than into employment.
These experiences have several implications for U.S. policy discussions. First, the fact
that most current DI recipients do not work is not evidence that they would have been
unable to work if given alternative policy treatments (e.g., timely accommodation and
rehabilitation). Indeed, the marked difference in outcomes between those given early
versus later employment-oriented services in the Netherlands and Sweden shows that
in a system oriented towards long-term cash benefits rather than work, many of those
with residual work capacity will never return to work.
The experiences in these countries also call into question the viability of ongoing
attempts to gain control of the U.S. DI rolls by funding additional continuing disability
reviews or enhancing post-entry rehabilitation or job training programs like Ticket-to-
Work. While such programs have merits, the experiences in Sweden tell us that these
efforts will fall short of bringing growth in the rolls down to sustainable levels.
Finally, the reforms and outcomes in these nations show the difficulties of focusing
policy reforms on current beneficiaries—a practice SSA is forced to follow by rules
requiring SSA-collected funds to be focused on current program recipients. This
suggests that eliminating this rule and allowing SSA to focus its energies on workers
with health-based work limitations who are trying to decide whether to stay on the job
or apply for benefits will likely do more to curb DI growth.
Lesson 4. Hurdles to reform in the U.S. are surmountable
Despite this growing body of evidence that structural reforms to long-term cash dis-
ability programs can curb program growth and potentially improve outcomes for those
with health-based impairments, the political coalition necessary to achieve fundamental
disability policy reform has been slow to evolve in the U.S. So what are the hurdles?
There are several including a number of concerns raised by supporters of the current
system. (See Reno and Ekman 2012 for a summary of these arguments.)
One issue raised in response to proposals for fundamental DI reform is that these
benefits, while not especially generous, are essential to keeping millions of disabled-
worker beneficiaries out of poverty. The evidence from Europe shows that this is a very
static view which assumes that in the absence of benefits, individuals with disabilities
would remain out of the labor market, dependent on other forms of public or private
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assistance for support. European disability reforms over the last decade provide plaus-
ible evidence that increased employment will occur when pro-work policies replace
policies that have had the opposite effect. Their reform experience shows that a signifi-
cant number of people with disabilities, who would otherwise have moved onto long-
term cash benefits, were able, with reasonable levels of support, to return to work.
While it is always the case that tightening the criteria for disability benefits runs the
risk of denying disability benefits to those who will not be able to find work, on balance
the European experience suggests that reasonable pro-work policies will both substan-
tially reduce disability recipiency rates and increase the employment of those who
would otherwise have been on the long-term disability rolls.
Nonetheless it is the case that fundamental DI reform could worsen the already pre-
carious economic position of some people with disabilities. But this should be put the
context of what has been happening to the overall well-being of working age people
with disabilities in the U.S. Over the past 25 years the household incomes of Americans
with disabilities have stagnated relative to other working-age people. This is associated,
in part, with the near continuous decline in their employment.
Our reading of the European evidence is that when programs are designed to award
cash transfers in lieu of work, employment falls. In contrast, when programs are
designed to encourage work and award transfers only when work clearly is not possible,
employment rises. Since work generally leads to increased income, especially when
public policies make work pay, efforts to promote work among those with disabilities
can produce positive outcomes.
The most important lesson though, is that by not working, long-term disability
beneficiaries will over time slip further and further behind the rest of the working-age
population, whose employment allows them to benefit from increased economic growth.
A final concern is that programs like DI are especially important in economic down-
turns where individuals with limited work capacity are not only more likely to be laid
off but less likely to find a new job. Past experience of European countries, especially
The Netherlands, which intentionally or unintentionally used this logic to turn their
long-term disability programs into more general unemployment programs, suggests
that it can be a very expensive and ultimately ineffective policy decision. Indeed, many
European nations continue to struggle to regain control over their disability systems
which for many decades have been used as long-term unemployment insurance pro-
grams. A key message from the European experience is that explicitly divorcing long-
term “unemployability” insurance from disability insurance is critical to effectively
targeting resources towards both populations.
Together the experiences of other nations suggest that it is possible to balance the
competing goals of providing social insurance against adverse health shocks during
working-age and maximizing the work effort of all working-age adults with and without
disabilities. Past disability policies in both the United States and other OECD countries
have focused more on the former than the latter, resulting in rapid growth in disability
transfer populations that outpaced growth in the economy. Efforts to shift to more
pro-work policies over the last decade in Europe suggest that fundamental disability
reforms, if done well, can lower projected long-term costs for taxpayers, make the job
of disability administrators less difficult, and importantly, improve the short- and long-run
opportunities of people with disabilities.
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Endnotes
1In a recent paper, Pattison and Waldron (2013) argue that population growth ex-
plains the bulk of the rise in disability recipiency in the U.S. In this paper we remove
the influence of population growth and consider the factors that explain the remaining
rise in the program. Since population growth alone would not put additional financial
pressure on the system, knowing these other factors is critical to policymakers tasked
with putting the system back on sustainable financial footing.
2The U.S. disability recipiency rate only includes beneficiaries receiving DI. Although
policymakers treat Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and DI as separate programs,
Burkhauser and Daly (2011 and 2013) argue that for the purpose of evaluating the role
of disability benefits in the U.S. they should be combined. When SSI-disabled adults
and DI program beneficiaries are combined, the level of the U.S. disability recipiency
rate is higher, but the patterns over time are roughly the same. See for instance
Burkhauser and Daly 2013, Figure 2.
3The fiscal burden of disability programs comes from the fact that beneficiaries
receive income support and they generally do not contribute to the tax base since they
are largely out of the labor force.
4Disability caseloads data are made public with a considerable lag in some countries.
Hence we can’t fully document how the Global Financial Crisis affected recipiency rates
in all countries.
5Some of the difference across countries relates to the age structure of the population.
Older populations report lower rates of good health than younger populations. Remaining
differences likely owe to reporting differences that are idiosyncratic to each country (see
Van Soest et al. 2011).
6The fact that adjusting for demographics and the entry of women into the labor
force in the U.S. explains only a fraction of the overall growth in disability recipiency
rates is consistent with research by Duggan and Scott 2009 and Daly et al. 2013. The
characterization of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration (see Goss
2013) contrast with this view, but this owes to the fact that they decompose growth in
disability caseloads rather than disability recipiency rates. As noted in footnote 1, we
believe this approach is less informative to policymakers.
7We are not the first to make this point. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2010) summary of disability program growth across OECD nations
concludes that policy rather than population characteristics are behind the rapid expansion
of disability benefit receipt in most nations. The point is also emphasized by Autor and
Duggan 2010 and Burkhauser and Daly 2011, 2012.
8There is no clear consensus on the most appropriate conceptualization of disability,
although the most widely used is the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International
Classification of Disability, Health, and Functioning (World Health Organization 2001).
9SSI is similar in design to Australia’s Disability Support Pension (DSP) and the
Dutch categorical disability-based welfare program (Wajong) but its income guarantee
level is substantially lower than either.
10The SSI aged and disabled adults programs share the same categorical eligibility
criteria applied for the earnings based retirement or Old-Age Insurance (OAI)
and Disability Insurance (DI) programs. Individuals with sufficiently low earnings
records may jointly qualify for OAI and SSI aged benefits and for DI and SSI
Burkhauser et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 27 of 302014, 3:4
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/4
disabled adult benefits. This said, these programs are generally treated separately
by policymakers.
11See Berkowitz and Burkhauser 1996 for more discussion of these changes and their
effects.
12Autor and Duggan (2006) argue that under these new eligibility standards, DI is a
form of “unemployability” insurance in which individuals who have limited employ-
ment options can find some way to qualify. They offer the example of individuals
removed from the rolls in 1996 when drug and alcohol addiction were removed from
qualifying impairments. Autor and Duggan (2010) cite research by the (Lewin 1995,
Policy evaluation of the effect of legislation prohibiting the payment of disability benefits to
individuals whose disability is based on drug addiction and alcoholism: Unpublished report.
1995, 1998) showing that two-thirds of those removed from the rolls re-qualified based on
some other impairment.
13A longer version of this summary of the Dutch system can be found in Burkhauser
and Daly 2011.
14Econometric studies of the Swedish system support this view. See for example
Rebick 1994; Larsson 2002.
15The Swedish government made numerous changes to sickness benefit replacement
rates, the number of days the employer paid for employee sickness absence, and the
number of days the worker had to wait before receiving sickness benefits (Andren
2003). In addition, policymakers removed most of the special allowances for disability
insurance afforded to unemployed and older workers Jonsson et al. 2011.
16Although what was assessed in practice was the claimant’s capacity to carry out a
series of routine tasks (Beatty and Fothergill 2005).
17For further details see Adam et al. (2010) and National Audit Office (2010).
18There is no tier two unemployment insurance benefit program in Australia. Rather,
unemployed workers are covered by a tier one universal minimum benefit, now called
the Newstart Allowance. Benefit levels, like in SSI, are need-based and do not require
past work experience. However, recipients are expected to return to work.
19See OECD 2003 and Bernd et al. 2004 for a discussion of this transformation in dis-
ability policy goals.
20Importantly, in Great Britain the assumption is that with appropriate support the
majority of individuals with disabilities can perform some type and amount of work.
21We use the following age groups for men and women (14 total demographic
groups): 20–29, 30–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54 55–59, and 60–64. For the Netherlands
age categories are decomposed as follows: 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64.
Additional file
: Appendix A. Data description and sources. Appendix B. Decomposing the disability recipiency
rate.
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